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TAXATION OF GAMBLERS: 





Gambling is everywhere. Whether it takes place in a casino, on the 
internet, or even on a cell phone, there is no shortage of venues for the avid 
gambler. With the rapid expansion and geographical spread of gambling 
activities in the United States and abroad, gamblers must understand the 
tax consequences of their gaming. For the professional, expenses incurred 
in his or her occupation are deductible but, like losses from wagering 
transactions, are limited to wagering gains. Recreational gamblers can 
also deduct wagering losses to the extent of gains, but expenses incurred in 
pursuit of their pastime (or compulsion) are nondeductible personal 
expenses. Explored in this Article are such topics as the computation and 
characterization of wagering gains, the treatment of cancellation of 
gambling indebtedness, the deductibility and substantiation of wagering 
losses, the classification and taxation of professional and amateur 
gamblers, the use of other tax entities to maximize the wagering loss 
deduction, and the deductibility of the cost of charity lotteries and raffles.  
This survey of tax laws and procedures as they relate to gamblers is 
designed to inform such risk takers of the tax consequences of their 
wagering activities and to encourage both professional and casual 
gamblers to keep detailed, contemporaneous records of their wins and 
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losses. If a gambler is unlucky, the Internal Revenue Service will 
reconstruct gambling income, disallow wagering losses, and—if the 
gambler is very unlucky—impose a multitude of tax penalties. 
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I. Introduction 
Gambling is apparently as old as the human race. The practice 
runs back through recorded history until it is lost amid the 
mysteries of tradition. It affects people in all latitudes, longitudes 
and stages of civilization.
1
 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Skeeles v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 242, 242 (Ct. Cl. 1951). 
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“Legal gambling is a multi-billion-dollar industry that has proliferated 
across the country and has become a major source of adult entertainment.”
2
 
In 2016, the U.S. gaming industry generated $73.1 billion in revenue, 
marking the seventh consecutive year of growth for the overall industry and 
the second time the industry surpassed $70 billion in total gaming revenue.
3
 
The U.S. commercial casino gaming segment of the industry generated a 
record $38.7 billion in revenue with 581 casinos across twenty-four states.
4
 
While only three states have legalized online gaming, the iGaming segment 
of the industry generated $212.2 million in revenue in 2016, the third full 
year of gaming operations.
5
 Tribal gaming generated an estimated $30.7 
billion in revenue marking the seventh consecutive year of growth in that 
segment of the industry.
6
 Limited stakes gaming, representing gaming 
machines at taverns, restaurants, and travel centers, generated $3.5 billion 
in revenue in 2016.
7
 
With such dramatic growth of the gaming industry, the tax consequences 
to an individual, whether visited or abandoned by Lady Luck, must be 
examined. This Article explores the tax treatment of gamblers: professional 
gamblers, who are engaged in the trade or business of gambling, and 
recreational gamblers, who are not. Both professional gamblers and 
recreational gamblers must include gambling winnings in income for tax 
purposes, raising issues as to the methods used for the computation of 
wagering gains by gamblers and the reconstruction of wagering gains by 
the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S. or Service). The characterization of 
gambling winnings and the cancellation of gambling indebtedness has 
recently generated conflicting results among the courts, thus warranting 
discussion. Penalties, both civil and criminal, which often attach to the 
under-inclusion of gambling income and the over-statement of gambling 
losses, are also examined. 
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 165(d) states that losses from 
“wagering transactions” are deductible only to the extent of gains from 
“wagering transactions.” Thus, identifying the types of activity that 
constitute wagering transactions is a threshold question. As to both gains 
and losses from wagering transactions, contemporaneous documentation is 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Libutti v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2343, 2343 (1996). 
 3. 2017 Gaming Statistics, RUBINBROWN 3 (Apr. 1, 2017), http://www.rubinbrown. 
com/Gaming_Stats.pdf. 
 4. Id. at 3. 
 5. Id. at 5. 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Id. 
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unequivocally necessary. This Article reviews guidelines established by the 
Service and courts for keeping the necessary books and records to 
substantiate wagering gains and losses. Further, the successful use of other 
tax entities by taxpayers to maximize the deduction of wagering losses is 
also discussed. 
The distinction between professional gamblers and recreational gamblers 
becomes pivotal in the computation of the gambler’s taxable income. 
Distinguishing between professional and recreational gamblers is a factual 
determination, aided by court decisions and Treasury regulations. Although 
wagering losses are limited to wagering gains, a professional gambler can 
also deduct gambling-related expenses incurred in the business of gambling 
to the extent of wagering gains. Nonprofessional gamblers are limited to the 
deduction of gambling losses to the extent of gains, which are treated as 
itemized deductions. Finally, the Article examines whether purchasers of 
lottery or raffle tickets may claim a charitable contribution deduction. 
II. Inclusion of Wagering Gains into Income  
Gross income includes income “from whatever sources derived.”
8
 Thus, 
gains realized from wagering transactions are included in the gross income 
of a gambler,
9
 whether the wagering activity is legal or illegal.
10
 Gambling 
                                                                                                                 
 8. I.R.C. § 61(a). The Supreme Court liberally defined income to include all 
“accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.” Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 9. I.R.C. § 61(a); Rev. Rul. 54-339, 1954-2 C.B. 89; Umstead v. Comm’r, 44 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1294, 1294 (1982); Dunnock v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 146, 146 (1980). The 
taxpayer must include in income all gambling winnings, not just gambling winnings to the 
extent gambling winnings exceed gambling losses. McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d 
630, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1961). A recreational gambler must report gambling income on Form 
1040 as “Other Income.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 525, 
TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE INCOME 31 (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/ 
p525.pdf. A professional gambler must report gambling income on Form 1040, Schedule C. 
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL 
BUSINESS (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p334.pdf [hereinafter IRS PUB. 
334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS]. I.R.C. § 3402(q)(1) requires the withholding of taxes 
on certain gambling winnings at a rate equal to the “third lowest rate” under I.R.C. § 1(c), or, 
if not subject to withholding, I.R.C. § 6654 may require the payment of estimated taxes 
during the tax year prior to filing a return. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, PUB. 505, TAX WITHHOLDING AND ESTIMATED TAX 14 (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p505.pdf. Generally, gambling winnings of more than $5000 
from any wagering transaction, reduced by the amount of the wager, are subject to 
withholding if the amount of the proceeds is at least 300 times the amount wagered.  I.R.C. § 
3402(q)(3)(A), (C)(ii).  Gambling winnings from the following sources are subject to 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/1
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income includes winnings from lotteries, raffles, horse racing, and 
casinos.
11
 In addition to cash winnings, gross income includes the fair 
market value of any prize or award received, including cars, watches, and 
trips.
12
 If a wagering transaction occurs in an earlier tax year, deferred 
payments received in a subsequent year by a cash-method taxpayer 
constitute wagering gains during the tax year in which payment is 
received.
13




                                                                                                                 
withholding if the gambling winnings are more than $5000: (1) sweepstakes; (2) wagering 
pools, including payments made to winners of poker tournaments; and (3) lotteries, whether 
or not State-conducted.  I.R.C. § 3402(q)(3)(B), (C)(i). Thus, regular gambling withholding 
does not apply to certain winnings from bingo, keno, or slot machines or winnings from 
other wagering transactions if the winnings are under specified limits. See Internal Revenue 
Serv., Form W-2G: Certain Gambling Winnings (2018), https://www. irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/fw2g.pdf [hereinafter IRS Form W-2G] (back side of form, “Instructions to Winner”). 
The payer must provide a copy of Form W-2G to the payee if the payee receives: (1) $1200 
or more in gambling winnings from bingo or slot machines; (2) $1500 or more in net 
winnings from keno; (3) more than $5000 of winnings, reduced by wager and buy-in, from a 
poker tournament; (4) $600 or more in gambling winnings if the payout is at least 300 times 
the amount of the wager; or (5) any other gambling winnings subject to withholding. Treas. 
Reg. §§ 1.6041-10(b)(1)(i), 1.6041-10(c) (2016); IRS Form W-2G, supra. Gambling 
winnings from bingo, keno, and slot machines are not subject to withholding, unless backup 
withholding is triggered by the failure of the winner to provide a taxpayer identification 
number. Treas. Reg. § 31.3406(g)-2(d) (2017). For purposes of information reporting, a 
session begins when the gambler first places a wager on a type of game at a gaming 
establishment and ends when that gambler places the last wager on the same type of game at 
the same gambling establishment before the end of a twenty-four-hour period. Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.6041-10(b)(2)(i), 1.6041-10(g) (2016). 
 10. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927).  
 11. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., NO. JCX-28-10, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL 
TAX LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO GAMBLING IN THE UNITED STATES 
15 (2010), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=3683&chk=3683 
&no_html=1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200417004 (Apr. 23, 2004). Although payments are 
deferred into a subsequent tax year, the amount won is not treated as constructively received 
or an economic benefit in the earlier tax year. Id. If the option is exercised within sixty days 
or less, the option to receive either a single cash payment or a series of payments over a 
period of at least ten years is not treated as constructively received in the year the option is 
received. I.R.C. § 451(h)(1). The cash method of accounting requires income to be reported 
in the tax year in which the income is actually or constructively received and deductions to 
be taken in the tax year in which payments are actually made. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) 
(2011).  
 14. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054, 2054–56 
(2017) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1). The 10% to 37% rates are effective for tax years 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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A. Computation of Wagering Gains 
Wagering gains are included in income, and wagering losses are 
deductible to the extent of wagering gains.
15
 Whether a taxpayer is a 
professional or recreational gambler, the ability of that taxpayer to deduct 
wagering losses is limited to the taxpayer’s wagering gains by I.R.C. § 
165(d).
16
 The amount of wagering gain is calculated by subtracting the 
amount of wager placed from the winnings produced.
17
 If property is won, 
the amount of the wagering gain is the difference between the value of the 
property and the cost of the winning bet or ticket.
18
 
As I.R.C. § 165(d) uses the plural term “transactions,” the wagering loss 
limitation has been interpreted to measure wagering gains and losses on a 
per-session basis, calculating wagering gains and losses over a series of 
separate plays or wagers.
19
 Thus, a series of separate plays or wagers may 
be combined in determining the amount of gambling winnings and losses.
20
 
To require that wagering gains and losses be computed on every wager 
separately and to treat every wager as a separate taxable event would be 
unduly burdensome and unreasonable.
21
 Further, the fluctuating gains and 
                                                                                                                 
beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 2026. Id.; see also Watkins v. Comm’r, 
447 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Davis v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 1, 4 (2002). 
 15. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 11, at 34. 
 16. Offutt v. Comm’r, 16 T.C. 1214, 1215 (1951), abrogated by Mayo v. Comm’r, 136 
T.C. 81 (2011); Skeeles v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 242, 247 (Ct. Cl. 1951).  
 17. Shollenberger v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 667, 669 (2009); Rev. Rul. 83-130, 
1983-2 C.B. 148. 
 18. Rev. Rul. 83-130, 1983-2 C.B. 148. 
 19. I.R.C. § 165(d); Park v. Comm’r, 722 F.3d 384, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding the 
per-session interpretation applied to nonresident aliens in I.R.C. § 871); Shollenberger, 98 
T.C.M. (CCH) at 668 (quoting I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. A.M.2008-011 (Dec. 12, 2008)); 
I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. AM2008-011 (Dec. 12, 2008)).  
 20. Shollenberger, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 669. I.R.S. Notice 2015-21 discusses a proposed 
revenue procedure that, if finalized, will provide an optional safe harbor method for 
determining a “session of play” for calculating gains or losses from electronically tracked 
slot-machine play. I.R.S. Notice 2015-21, 2015-12 I.R.B. 765. A “session of play” would 
begin when a patron places the first wager on a particular type of game and end when the 
same patron completes the last wager on the same type of game before the end of the same 
calendar day. Id. The safe harbor would generally be effective for the tax years ending on or 
before the date of publication of the final revenue procedure. Id.  For horse races, dog races, 
and jai alai, all wagers placed in a single parimutuel pool and represented on a single ticket 
are aggregated and treated as a single wager for the purposes of determining the amount of 
the wager for tax withholding.  Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(q)-1(c)(1)(ii) (2017). 
 21. Shollenberger, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 668 (quoting I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 
AM2008-011 (Dec. 12, 2008)). The gambler would have to calculate gain or loss separately 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/1
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losses left in play are not accessions to wealth until the taxpayer terminates 




With regard to slot machine play, for example, the taxpayer recognizes 
wagering gain or loss at the time slot-machine tokens, which were received 
in exchange for cash, are redeemed.
23
 Under this methodology, gambling 
income is reduced by the amount with which the taxpayer begins play and 
amounts withdrawn from any winnings for additional gambling.
24
  
Example: Taxpayer, who enters the casino with $100 and 
redeems tokens for $300 after playing slot machines, has a 
wagering gain of $200 ($300 - $100). This is the result even if, 
during the day, Taxpayer has $1000 in winning spins and $700 
in losing spins. Further, if Taxpayer enters the casino with $100 
and loses the entire amount after playing slot machines, 
Taxpayer has a wagering loss of $100, even though Taxpayer 
may have had winning spins of $1000 and losing spins of $1100 
during the course of play.
25
 
Example: Taxpayer enters the casino with $500 and, on the 
same day, wins a $2000 jackpot from which $400 was taken out 
for additional slot-machine play. If the Taxpayer leaves the 
casino that day with $1600, Taxpayer has a wagering gain of 
$1100 ($2000 - $400 - $500).
26
 
Example: Taxpayer, who plays the slot machines, buys $100 of 
tokens at the start of each day and redeems any remaining tokens 
at the end of the day. Over a ten-day period, Taxpayer loses 
$100 for five days, loses $30 ($100 - $70 tokens redeemed) on 
one day, and loses $80 ($100 - $80 tokens redeemed) on another 
day, for a total of $610 in losses. On three days, Taxpayer wins 
$50 ($150 tokens redeemed - $100), $100 ($200 tokens 
redeemed - $100), and $200 ($300 tokens redeemed - $100), for 
a total of $350 in winnings. For the ten-day period, Taxpayer has 
                                                                                                                 
on every play or wager, requiring the taxpayer to trace and recompute the basis through all 
of the transactions to calculate the result of each play or wager. Id. (quoting I.R.S. Chief 
Couns. Adv. AM2008-011 (Dec. 12, 2008)). 
 22. Id. (quoting I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. AM2008-011 (Dec. 12, 2008)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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B. Characterization of Wagering Income 
Gambling winnings are taxed as ordinary income, which is subject to tax 
rates ranging from 10% to 37%.
28
 However, gains characterized as long-
term capital gains are taxed at a preferential rate of 15%.
29
 The 20% rate 
applies to the long-term capital gain of high-income taxpayers.
30
 Unless the 
character of gain is statutorily provided, capital gains only result from a 




In Prebola v. Commissioner,
32
 the taxpayer won $17.5 million in the 
New York State Lottery, payable in twenty-six annual installments.
33
 After 
receiving the first three payments, which were reported as ordinary income, 
the taxpayer sold her right to receive the remaining payments to a third 
party for the lump-sum amount of $7.1 million.
34
 On her tax return for the 
year of the sale, the taxpayer reported $7.1 million of long-term capital 
gain.
35
 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals began its opinion by noting: 
The issue in this case is whether lump-sum proceeds received 
from a sale of future interest in lottery payments should be 
characterized for income tax purposes as a capital gain or as 
ordinary income. The United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, along with the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 27. I.R.S. Chief. Couns. Adv. AM2008-011 (Dec. 12, 2008). 
 28. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054, 2054–56 
(2017) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1). The 10% to 37% rates are effective for tax years 
beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 2026. Id.; see also Watkins v. Comm’r, 
447 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Davis v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 1, 4 (2002) 
 29. I.R.C. § 1(h). Depending on the type of asset that generated the gain, generally, 
long-term capital gain is subject to three maximum rates of taxation: (1) 28% for collectible 
gain and I.R.C. § 1202 gain; (2) 25% for unrecaptured I.R.C. § 1250 gain; and (3) 15% for 
adjusted net capital gain. Id. 
 30. Id.  § 1(h)(1).  For 2018, the 20% breakpoint is $479,999 for joint returns and 
surviving spouses (half this amount for married taxpayers filing separately), $452,000 for 
heads of household, and $425,000 for other unmarried individuals. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 
11001(a)(5).   
 31. I.R.C. § 1222(1)–(4). 
 32. 482 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 33. Id. at 610-11. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/1
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Tax Court in numerous rulings, have all held that such proceeds 
are properly characterized as ordinary income. We have no 
difficulty reaching the same conclusion.
36
 
Although I.R.C. § 1221 defines the term “capital asset” broadly, the 
Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has limited the scope of this 
provision in certain contexts, “such as here, where the ‘property’ at issue is 
a right to receive ordinary income.”
37
 Applying the substitute-for-ordinary-
income doctrine, the Second Circuit found that the $7.1 million received by 
the taxpayer was clearly a substitute for the remainder of the lottery 
payments that would have been received in the future as ordinary income.
38
 
C. Reconstruction of Wagering Income 
A taxpayer is under the obligation to “keep such records, render such 
statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations 
as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe.”
39
 If the taxpayer fails to 
file a return, files an inaccurate return, does not keep records, or keeps 
inaccurate records, the Service is given “great latitude” in adopting a 
suitable method for reconstructing the taxpayer’s income.
40
 The Service is 
not required to use any particular method of reconstructing income, but may 
use any method that clearly reflects the taxable income of the taxpayer.
41
 
Although the Service has the initial burden of proof,
42
 the Service’s 
reconstruction of taxable income is presumed correct, and the taxpayer has 
the burden of proving that the deficiency notice was arbitrary, capricious, 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. (citations omitted); see also Womack v. Comm’r, 510 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 
2007); Lattera v. Comm’r, 437 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2006); Watkins v. Comm’r, 447 F.3d 1269 
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004); Davis v. 
Comm’r, 119 T.C. 1 (2002).  
 37. Prebola, 482 F.3d at 611 (citing Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266 
(1985)). 
 38. Id. at 612. 
 39. I.R.C. § 6001; see Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (1990) (requiring taxpayers to “keep 
such permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to 
establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required to be 
shown by such person in any return of such tax or information”).  
 40. Ramsey v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1150, 1155 (1980).  
 41. Id. at 1155-56. The method used by the government to reconstruct income is not 
conclusive, allowing the taxpayer to present alternative methods that may be more accurate. 
Kikalos v. United States, 408 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 42. See Szkircsak v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 208, 211 (1980) (finding the Service 
did not present evidence of an increase in net worth or unexplained bank deposits to support 
the Service’s argument that the taxpayer had unreported gambling income). 
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 Courts do not require the Service’s computation to be 
exact; however, the Service must employ reasonable means and be 
relatively exact when determining the taxpayer’s taxable income.
44
 
Depending on the facts and circumstances of each reconstruction, the 
Service may establish the taxable income of a taxpayer by direct or several 
indirect methods of proof.
45
 The method most preferred by the Service is 
the direct method, referred to as the “specific item method.”
46
 The specific 
item method of reconstructing income uses books and records of the 
taxpayer in which transactions are contemporaneously recorded and then 
summarized on the tax return.
47
 Generally, the special agent will gather 
evidence to determine the amount of income that the taxpayer should have 
included on the tax return and compare that amount to the income the 
taxpayer actually included on the return.
48
 If a taxpayer fails to keep books 
and records or if the taxpayer’s books and records are not available, 
inadequate, or withheld, an indirect method of reconstructing taxable 
income may be employed.
49
  
The indirect methods of proving income that the courts have upheld are: 
(1) the net worth method; (2) the expenditures method; and (3) the bank 
deposit method.
50
 Generally, the net worth method measures the increase in 
net worth of the taxpayer calculated at the beginning and end of each tax 
year.
51
 The assumption is that the taxpayer’s increase in net worth, plus the 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Elizabeth M. Rutherford, Note, Taxation of Drug Traffickers’ Income: What the 
Drug Trafficker Profiteth, the IRS Taketh Away, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 716 (1991).  
 44. Id. at 713–14. 
 45. IRM 9.5.9.1 (Nov. 5, 2004).  
 46. IRM 9.5.9.2.1 (Nov. 5, 2004). 
 47. Id. The three circumstances suited for the use of the specific item method are: (1) 
understatement of income; (2) overstatement of expenses; and (3) fraudulent claims for 
credits or exemptions. IRM 9.5.9.2.1.2 (Nov. 5, 2004); see Durland v. Comm’r, 112 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 37 (2016) (holding stipulations that the taxpayer received certain payments and that 
he did not keep adequate records were sufficient to allow the presumption of correctness to 
attach to the Service’s determinations and justified the use of the specific item method of 
reconstructing income). 
 48. IRM 9.5.9.2.1.1 (Nov. 5, 2004). 
 49. Rutherford, supra note 43, at 713. 
 50. IRM 9.5.9.2.2.3 (Nov. 5, 2004). Two additional indirect methods used by the 
Service to establish income are the percentage markup method and the unit and volume 
method. IRM 9.5.9.1.1 (Nov. 5, 2004).  
 51. Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, How the IRS Reconstructs Income Without 
Records, TAX’N FOR ACCT., Jan. 2005, at 30; see Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 129 
(1954) (sanctioning and detailing the use of the net worth method of reconstructing taxable 
income). 
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taxpayer’s nondeductible personal expenses, must have been financed by 
taxable and nontaxable income.
52
 The expenditures method compares the 
taxpayer’s expenditures with the taxpayer’s receipt of income.
53
 The 
assumption is that the amount by which the taxpayer’s expenditures during 
the tax year exceed known sources of income, if unexplained, represents 
unreported income.
54
 The bank deposit method is a means of verifying the 
taxpayer’s receipts and expenditures.
55
 The assumption is that the 
taxpayer’s bank deposits represent income and, if not income, the taxpayer 
is in the best position to explain the nature of the deposits.
56
 The bank 
deposit method requires an analysis of the taxpayer’s bank account(s), 
which may reveal unreported income or provide leads to unreported income 
by tracing the deposits to their source.
57
 The most common defenses to the 
indirect methods of reconstruction are: cash “hoards” from previous years, 
funds being held for other parties, nontaxable loans, and undisclosed gifts.
58
 
In Farkas v. Commissioner,
59
 the taxpayer, a craps dealer, received an 
hourly wage and was permitted to keep tips (often referred to in the gaming 
industry as “tokes”), which were pooled and divided among the dealers 
according to hours worked.
60
 For the tax year at issue, the taxpayer reported 
$4800 in toke income, but the Service determined that the taxpayer actually 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Knight & Knight, supra note 51. Generally, the difference in the taxpayer’s net 
worth from the previous tax year is: (1) increased by the amount of personal living expenses, 
nondeductible losses, and gifts made; and (2) decreased by any nontaxable sources of funds, 
such as gifts and inheritances received. IRM 9.5.9.5.8.1 (Nov. 5, 2004).  
 53. Knight & Knight, supra note 51, at 32. 
 54. Id.; see United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) (sanctioning the use of the 
expenditures method of reconstructing taxable income). The expenditures method of proof is 
used if the taxpayer’s net worth has not substantially changed or when significant and 
extravagant living expenditures are apparent during the period under investigation. IRM 
9.5.9.6.2 (Nov. 5, 2004). For example, the taxpayer has spent substantial income on 
consumable goods and services, such as food, vacations, and gifts, as opposed to durable 
goods, such as stocks, bonds, and real estate. Id. 
 55. Jim Swayze & John C. Zimmerman, IRS Steps Up Indirect Methods of Establishing 
Income, TAX’N FOR ACCT., Feb. 1994, at 92. 
 56. Knight & Knight, supra note 51, at 33. 
 57. Rutherford, supra note 43, at 727. The Service does not have to prove that the bank 
deposits are income or establish a likely source of unreported income, as the taxpayer has the 
burden of proving that the deposits represent nontaxable income. Knight & Knight, supra 
note 51, at 33. 
 58. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 127 (1954); Knight & Knight, supra note 
51, at 30; Swayze & Zimmerman, supra note 55, at 92;.  
 59. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 402, 402-03 (1986). 
 60. Id. at 403. 
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received $18,431.90 in toke income.
61
 The taxpayer testified that he kept a 
record of daily toke receipts on a calendar but was unable to produce the 
calendar at the time of trial.
62
 The Service reconstructed the taxpayer’s toke 
income by examining the daily receipts reported by several of the casino’s 
dealers.
63
 From these reports, the Service established the total daily receipts 
most frequently reported by the dealers for each eight-hour shift and, 
ultimately, the monthly average, daily average, and hourly average.
64
 The 
$18.431.90 toke income was computed by multiplying the average hourly 
rate times the hours which the taxpayer worked during the tax year.
65
 Since 
the taxpayer failed to meet his burden of proving the amount was 
erroneous, the Service’s determination of the taxpayer’s unreported toke 
income was sustained.
66
 As the taxpayer failed to maintain accurate records 
of his toke income and presented no evidence to justify his failure to do so, 
the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty was also sustained.
67
  
D. Cancellation of Gambling Indebtedness 
Generally, amounts borrowed are not included in income because of the 
borrower’s corresponding obligation to repay.
68
 The receipt of the loan does 
not increase the borrower’s net worth; hence, the borrower does not have 
income.
69
 However, if the borrower is able to satisfy the debt for less than 
the amount owed, the amount discharged constitutes cancellation of 
indebtedness income.
70
 In 1954, I.R.C. § 61, defining the term “gross 
income,” was amended to explicitly include “[i]ncome from discharge of 
indebtedness.”
71
 In the same year, I.R.C. § 108 was enacted to provide for 
the exclusion of cancellation of indebtedness in limited circumstances.
72
 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 404. The civil negligence penalty is now included in I.R.C. § 6662 and the 
civil fraud penalty is currently codified in I.R.C. § 6663. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 111-128 
(describing and discussing I.R.C. §§ 6662 and 6663). 
 68. BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 4.05[1] (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter BITTKER ET AL.]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12); BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 4.05[2]. 
 72. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A)-(D); BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 4.05[2]. I.R.C. § 108 
excludes from income discharge of indebtedness if the discharge involves: bankruptcy, 
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In Zarin v. Commissioner,
73
 the taxpayer was a compulsive gambler who 
lost $3,435,000 in chips furnished to him by the casino while playing 
craps.
74
 The taxpayer denied liability on the ground that the casino’s claim 
was unenforceable under a state law intended to protect compulsive 
gamblers.
75
 The taxpayer and the casino settled their dispute for a total of 
$500,000.
76
 The Service argued that settlement of a $3,435,000 debt for 
$500,000 caused the taxpayer to recognize $2,935,000 of cancellation of 
indebtedness income.
77
 The casino advanced the taxpayer $3,435,000 worth 
of chips, which were the functional equivalent of cash and, on receipt, were 
not treated as income because of the taxpayer’s recognized obligation to 
repay.
78
 The cancellation of a tax-free loan, in whole or in part, “fits neatly 
into the cancellation of indebtedness provisions in the Code.”
79
 
The taxpayer contended that the settlement agreement with the casino 
did not give rise to cancellation of indebtedness income because the debt 
instruments were unenforceable under state law.
80
 “[H]is debt was 
unenforceable and thus there was no debt to be discharged and no resulting 
freeing up of assets because his assets were never encumbered.”
81
 Further, 
because the credit extended was in the form of chips (which were a 
nonnegotiable medium of exchange useable only in the casino), the 
taxpayer maintained that the settlement should be treated as a purchase 
price adjustment and not cancellation of indebtedness.
82
 Finally, relying on 
the contested-liability exception to cancellation of indebtedness income, the 




The Tax Court found that the taxpayer received value in the form of an 
opportunity to gamble and other benefits at the time the debt was incurred 
and only the promise to repay prevented the taxation of the value 
                                                                                                                 
insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, or qualified real property business indebtedness. 
I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A)-(D). 
 73. 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 74. Id. at 112. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 113. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1090 (1989), rev’d 916 F. 2nd 110 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1097. The taxpayer argued that the settlement constituted a purchase price 
adjustment under I.R.C. § 108(e)(5). Id.  
 83. Id. at 1096. 
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 “When, in the subsequent year, a portion of the obligation to 
repay was forgiven, the general rule that income results from forgiveness of 
indebtedness, section 61(a)(12), should apply.”
85
 Further, the legal 
enforceability of the taxpayer’s debt did not determine whether discharge of 
indebtedness income was recognized,
86
 and the settlement of the claim with 
the casino could not be interpreted as a purchase price adjustment.
87
 Finally, 
the principle that the settlement of a disputed debt does not result in income 
was inapplicable because the taxpayer’s gambling debt to the casino was a 
liquidated amount, and the parties disputed only legal enforceability and not 
the amount of the debt.
88
  
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court, finding that 
the term “indebtedness of the taxpayer,” as defined in I.R.C. § 108(d)(1), 
was not applicable to the taxpayer’s settlement with the casino.
89
 I.R.C. § 
108(d)(1) requires an indebtedness: “(A) for which the taxpayer is liable, or 
(B) subject to which the taxpayer holds property.”
90
 The taxpayer was not 
indebted to the casino because the casino’s claim against the taxpayer was 
unenforceable, and the gambling chips were not property held by the 
taxpayer subject to the debt, but instead were only a medium of exchange 
for gambling within the casino.
91
 The Third Circuit also relied on the 
disputed debt or contested liability exception in holding that the taxpayer 
did not have income from cancellation of indebtedness.
92
 As the debt was 
unenforceable under state law, the parties merely settled the amount of the 
dispute at $500,000, which the taxpayer paid.
93
  
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. at 1094. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1094-95. 
 87. Id. at 1098. For a debt reduction to be treated as a purchase price adjustment under 
I.R.C. § 108(e)(5), the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) the indebtedness must be 
between the purchaser and seller of property and must have arisen out of the purchase of the 
property; (2) the purchaser must be solvent and not in bankruptcy; and (3) except for this 
provision, the indebtedness reduction would have given rise to discharge of indebtedness 
income. Id. at 1097-98. 
 88. Id. at 1104 (Tannewald, J., dissenting). 
 89. Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit applied the 
definition of “indebtedness of the taxpayer,” as provided in I.R.C. § 108(d)(1), for the 
purpose of defining cancellation of indebtedness income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). Id.  
 90. I.R.C. § 108(d)(1)(A)-(B).  
 91. Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116. 
 92. Id. at 115. 
 93. Id. The Third Circuit noted that if the taxpayer had not paid the $500,000 settlement, 
the taxpayer would have cancellation of indebtedness income. Id. at 115 n.10. 
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In Preslar v. Commissioner,
94
 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
rejected the reasoning in Zarin, limiting the application of the disputed 
liability doctrine to unliquidated debts.
95
  
The problem with the Third Circuit’s holding is it treats 
liquidated and unliquidated debts alike. The whole theory behind 
requiring that the amount of the debt be disputed before the 
contested liability exception can be triggered is that only in the 
context of disputed debts is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
unaware of the exact consideration initially exchanged in a 
transaction. The mere fact that the taxpayer challenges the 
enforceability of the debt in good faith does not necessarily 
mean he or she is shielded from discharge-of-indebtedness 
income upon resolution of the dispute. To implicate the 
contested liability doctrine, the original amount of the debt must 
be unliquidated. Total denial of liability is not a dispute touching 
upon the amount of the underlying debt.
96
 
E. Civil and Criminal Penalties 
Taxpayers engaged in gambling activities are often liable for both unpaid 
taxes and civil and criminal penalties as the result of the under-inclusion of 
income, the overstatement of deductions, or both. In addition to any 
supplementary tax and interest, civil penalties are assessed, collected, and 
subject to the same interest rate and statute of limitations as the regular tax 
liability.
97
 The Service may also assert criminal penalties.
98
 Unlike civil 
penalties, however, criminal penalties are not collected through the 
assessment procedures but are imposed in criminal proceedings and may 
result in fines and/or terms of imprisonment.
99
 The major difference 
between civil and criminal penalties is the degree of proof required by the 
government.
100
 In civil cases, the government must introduce sufficient 
evidence to prove the imposition of the penalty by “clear and convincing 
                                                                                                                 
 94. 167 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 95. Id. at 1325. 
 96. Id. at 1328 (citation omitted); see BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 4.05[3][c]. 
(discussing the law and cases establishing the disputed liabilities exception to inclusion of 
cancellation of indebtedness income). 
 97. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 50.03. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943).  
 100. IRM 25.1.1.2.2.2 (Jan. 23, 2014).  
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evidence,” while in criminal cases, guilt must be proven by the more 
rigorous “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.
101
 
1. Civil Penalties 
It has been stated that the Internal Revenue Code contains “a mind-
numbing assortment of civil penalties.”
102
 Civil penalties are imposed in 
addition to any underpayment of tax and are assessed and collected along 
with any underpayment.
103
 While the normal burden of proof rules apply to 
evidence of a deficiency, the “IRS bears the burden of proof with respect to 
penalties and additions to tax.”
104
 The Service must initially demonstrate 
the appropriateness of imposing a particular penalty or addition to tax.
105
 In 
response, the taxpayer may introduce evidence of reasonable cause, 
substantial authority, or other defenses to negate the application of the 
penalty provision.
106
 To avoid a penalty, reliance on professional advice 
does not necessarily constitute reasonable cause and good faith.
107
  
a) I.R.C. § 6651—Failure to File a Tax Return or Pay Tax 
If a taxpayer fails to file a tax return or fails to pay the tax shown (or 
required to have been shown) on a tax return, a penalty is imposed unless 
the taxpayer shows that the delay resulted from reasonable cause and not 
from willful neglect.
108
 Reasonable cause for failure to pay tax is shown if 
the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence, but was unable 
to pay or would suffer undue hardship if payment was made on the due 
date.
109 
Special circumstances that warrant relief include the following: (1) 
the inability to comply with the tax law due to circumstances beyond the 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. 
 102. Michael Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns, 23 
UCLA L. REV. 637, 637 (1976). 
 103. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 50.03.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Tollis v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1951, 1960 (1993) (citing United States v. 
Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1985)). 
 108. I.R.C. § 6651(a). The penalty for failure to file a return is 5% of the amount the 
taxpayer was required to show for the first month, plus an additional 5% for each month 
thereafter, not to exceed 25%. Id. § 6651(a)(1). The penalty for failure to pay the tax in a 
timely manner is 0.5% of the amount shown on the tax return for the first month, plus an 
additional 0.5% for each month thereafter, not to exceed 25%. Id. § 6651(a)(2), (3). If the 
failure to file is due to fraudulent intent, the penalty for failure to file a timely tax return 
increases to 15% per month with a maximum of 75%. Id. § 6651(f). 
 109. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (1996).  
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taxpayer’s control; (2) the death, serious illness, or unavoidable absence of 
the taxpayer or a member of the taxpayer’s immediate family; (3) an event 
such as fire, casualty, natural disaster, or other disturbance; (4) the 
unobtainability of records necessary to comply with a tax obligation; and 




b) I.R.C. § 6662—Accuracy Related Penalty on Underpayments  
The accuracy related penalty on underpayments attaches to specified, 
proscribed conduct, including: (1) negligence or disregard of tax rules and 
regulations,
111
 and (2) a substantial underpayment of tax.
112
 The penalty is 
20% of the underpayment attributable to the proscribed conduct.
113
 
Generally, the accuracy related penalty will not be imposed on any portion 
of an underpayment if the taxpayer shows a reasonable and good faith effort 
to comply with the tax laws.
114
  
With regard to the penalty for “negligence or disregard of rule or 
regulations,” the term “negligence” includes any failure to make a 
reasonable attempt to comply with the tax laws, exercise ordinary care in 
tax return preparation, or keep adequate books and records.
115
 The penalty 
for negligence will not apply if the taxpayer’s position has a reasonable 
basis.
116
 “Disregard” includes any careless, reckless, or intentional 
disregard of tax statutes and regulations.
117
 The penalty for the disregard of 
tax statutes and regulations does not apply if the taxpayer adequately 




A “substantial understatement” of tax occurs if the amount of the 
understatement exceeds the greater of: (1) 10% of the tax required to be 
shown on the return or (2) $5000.
119
 The accuracy related penalty will not 
                                                                                                                 
 110. IRM 20.1.1.3.2.2 (Feb. 22, 2008); IRM 20.1.1.3.2.2.1 (Nov. 25, 2011); IRM 
20.1.1.3.2.2.2 (Aug. 5, 2014); IRM 20.1.1.3.2.2.3 (Dec. 11, 2009); IRM 20.1.1.3.2.2.5 (Nov. 
25, 2011). 
 111. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1), (c).  
 112. Id. § 6662(b)(2), (d). 
 113. Id. § 6662(a); see id. § 6662(b) (listing additional proscribed conduct for which the 
accuracy-related penalty is imposed). 
 114. Id. § 6664(c)(1).  
 115. Id. § 6662(c); see also IRM 20.1.5.7.1 (Dec. 13, 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) 
(2003) (defining the term “negligence” for the purpose of the accuracy-related penalty). 
 116. IRM 20.1.5.7.1(3) (Dec. 13, 2016). 
 117. I.R.C. § 6662(c). 
 118. IRM 20.1.5.7.2.1(3) (Jan. 24, 2012). 
 119. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A).  
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be imposed on any portion of an underpayment if the taxpayer shows a 
reasonable and good faith effort to comply with the tax laws.
120
 The amount 
of the understatement is reduced if: (1) substantial authority exists for the 
position taken or (2) relevant facts are adequately disclosed on the tax 
return and there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of the item.
121
  
c) I.R.C. § 6663—Imposition of Civil Fraud Penalty  
If any part of a tax deficiency is due to fraud with the intent to evade tax, 
the amount of the civil fraud penalty is 75% of the portion of the 
underpayment attributable to fraud.
122
 The Service must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the taxpayer is guilty of fraudulent intent to evade 
taxes.
123
 As distinguished from negligence, fraud is always an intentional 
act.
124
 Generally, fraud involves one or more of the following elements: 
deception, misrepresentation of material facts, false or altered documents, 
or evasion.
125
 The fraud penalty is not imposed on any portion of the 
underpayment if the taxpayer shows a reasonable and good faith effort to 
comply with the tax laws.
126
  
Since direct proof of fraud is rarely available, the Service may prove 
fraud by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.
127
 Although a 
determination of fraud is based on a taxpayer’s entire course of action, 
some of the common indicators considered by the Service in evidencing an 
“intent to evade tax” are: (1) understatement of income (for example, 
omission of specific items or sources of income or substantial income); (2) 
fictitious or improper deductions (for example, overstatement of expenses); 
(3) accounting irregularities (for example, two sets of books and false 
entries); (4) obstructive actions of the taxpayer (for example, false 
statements, destruction of records, transfer or concealment of assets, and 
failure to cooperate with the examiner); (5) a consistent pattern of 
underreporting income; (6) implausible or inconsistent explanations; (7) 
engaging in illegal activities or attempting to conceal illegal activities; (8) 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. § 6664(c)(1).  
 121. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B).  
 122. Id. § 6663(a).  
 123. DiLeo v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 858, 873 (1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 124. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 50.06. Tax fraud is an intentional wrongdoing with 
the specific purpose of evading a tax owed, requiring both a tax due and fraudulent intent. 
IRM 25.1.1.2 (Jan. 23, 2014). 
 125. IRM 25.1.6.3(1) (Nov. 5, 2014). 
 126. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).  
 127. IRM 25.1.6.3(1) (Nov. 5, 2014). 
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keeping inadequate records; (9) dealing in cash; (10) failing to file returns; 
or (11) education and experience.
128
  
d) Tschetschot v. Commissioner  
In Tschetschot v. Commissioner,
129
 the taxpayers, professional gamblers, 
contended that tournament poker was not a wagering transaction and was 
therefore not subject to the wagering loss limitation under I.R.C. § 
165(d).
130
 The taxpayers argued, similar to other professional sporting 
tournaments, participants in tournament poker pay an entry fee and compete 
to win prizes through good fortune and superior skill.
131
 The taxpayers 
contended that poker tournaments are different than live-action poker 
because the participants pay a “buy-in,” a portion of which funds the prize 
“pot.”
132
 Because of the buy-in system, the only monetary loss a participant 
may incur is the amount of the buy-in and any re-buys.
133
 Although the 
participant is out of the game once out of chips, the amount of the chips 
received may not correlate to the buy-in or prizes, and the chips themselves 
have no intrinsic value.
134
 Finding betting is intrinsic to the game of poker, 
the Tax Court held that tournament poker was a wagering activity similar to 
other types of poker.
135
 Akin to live-action poker, success in tournament 
poker depends on a combination of both luck and skill.
136
 “Bets are placed 
on each hand, and each round of betting has consequences.”
137
  
The Tax Court in Tschetschot sustained the 20% accuracy related penalty 
for substantial understatement of tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 6662.
138
 Although 
the penalty is not imposed if the taxpayer demonstrates a reasonable and 
good faith effort to comply with the tax laws, the Tax Court found that the 
taxpayers demonstrated neither reasonable cause nor good faith efforts to 
comply with the tax laws.
139
 The Tax Court found that no substantial 
                                                                                                                 
 128. IRM 25.1.6.3(2). 
 129. 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 914 (2007). 
 130. Id. at 915. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 916. 
 136. Id. at 915. 
 137. Id. at 916.  
 138. Id. at 917. 
 139. Id. (“[P]etitioners were clearly aware of the mandate of section 165(d); their wish 
that it be inapplicable to tournament poker does not constitute the type of misunderstanding 
contemplated by the statutes or the regulations.”). 
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authority existed as to the inapplicability of I.R.C. § 165(d) and, whether or 




2. Criminal Penalties 
Criminal tax penalties, which impose fines and/or terms of 
imprisonment, may also be asserted by the Service. Unlike civil penalties, 
criminal penalties are not collected through the assessment procedures but 
are instead imposed in criminal proceedings.
141
 Although the criminal fraud 
provisions often encompass the same conduct as the civil fraud penalty, the 
government must prove criminal fraud by the higher standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
142
 The elements of the various criminal penalties may 
overlap, but all require the element of willfulness.
143
 Willfulness may be 
refuted by the demonstration of a good faith reliance on a tax advisor if all 
relevant facts were disclosed by the taxpayer.
144
 
a) I.R.C. § 7201—Attempt to Evade Tax 
A taxpayer who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax is guilty of 
a felony and, upon conviction, will be fined not more than $100,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of 
prosecution.
145
 The term “willfulness” requires “a voluntary, intentional 
violation of a known legal duty;”
146
 thus, willfulness does not include a 
“frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of 
reasonable care.”
147
 The element of willfulness can be inferred from facts 
and circumstances such as evidence of a consistent pattern of 
underreporting large amounts of income or the failure to include all income 
in books and records.
148
 Although the mere failure to file a tax return does 
not constitute an affirmative act of tax evasion,
149
 the requirement of an 
affirmative act of evasion of tax, or attempted evasion of tax, can be 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. 
 141. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943).  
 142. Id. A civil penalty may be imposed after an acquittal in a criminal prosecution as the 
Service’s burden of proof in the former is clear and convincing evidence and in the latter is 
beyond a reasonable doubt. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 50.06. 
 143. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973).  
 144. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 50.08[2]. 
 145. I.R.C. § 7201. 
 146. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 360. 
 147. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943).  
 148. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954). 
 149. Spies, 317 U.S. at 497-98. 
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inferred from conduct, including keeping a double set of books, making 
false entries or alterations, creating false invoices or documents, destroying 
books or records, concealing assets or covering up sources of income, 
handling one’s affairs to avoid making the usual books and records, and any 
conduct whose purpose is to mislead or to conceal.
150
  
b) I.R.C. § 7203—Willful Failure to File a Return, Supply Information, 
or Pay Tax 
A willful failure to file a tax return, keep records, supply information, or 
pay tax at the time required constitutes a misdemeanor subject to a fine of 
not more than $25,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both, 
plus the costs of prosecution.
151
 This penalty is imposed even though the 
intent was not to defraud the government if the intention resulted in a 
failure to discharge a known legal duty.
152
 Failure to file a return and pay 
tax, if the taxpayer knows the tax is due, is a willful omission and, as such, 
a misdemeanor.
153
 However, a good faith belief that a tax return is not 
required is a defense to the charge of willful failure to file even if the belief 
is objectively unreasonable.
154
 Additionally, a good faith belief that the 
filing of a tax return violates the taxpayer’s privilege against self-
incrimination is a defense to the charge of willful failure to file.
155
  
c) I.R.C. §§ 7206—Fraudulent and False Statements 
Each of the following offenses constitutes a felony, punishable with a 
fine of not more than $100,000 or imprisonment of not more than three 
years, or both, plus the costs of prosecution: (1) willfully making a false 
declaration under penalty of perjury; (2) willfully aiding or assisting in the 
preparation of any return or other document that is fraudulent or false as to 
any material matter; (3) willfully falsifying or fraudulently executing or 
signing any bond, permit, entry, or other document required by the tax 
laws; (4) willfully removing, depositing, or concealing property upon which 
tax is imposed or levied, with intent to evade or defeat the assessment or 
collection of any tax; and (5) willfully concealing property or withholding, 
falsifying, or destroying records, or making any false statement in 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. at 499. 
 151. I.R.C. § 7203.  
 152. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 50.08[5]. 
 153. Spies, 317 U.S. at 493. 
 154. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 50.08[5]. 
 155. Id. 
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connection with any compromise or closing agreement.
156
 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the term “willfully” to connote “a voluntary, 
intentional violation of a known legal duty.”
157
 A conviction can be based 
on a willful omission of a material fact as well as on an affirmative false 
statement.
158
 Although the defect must be material, the government need 
not prove that the Service relied on the false statement
159




d) McClanahan v. United States 
In McClanahan v. United States,
161
 the Service contended and supported 
with sufficient evidence that the taxpayer made approximately $50,000 in 
gambling winnings, which he did not report on his tax return and took 
considerable effort to conceal.
162
 At trial, a witness testified that the 
taxpayer had put his gambling winnings into a safety deposit box instead of 
a bank because, in an earlier prosecution, the Service was able to prove 
gambling winnings through bank deposits.
163
 The taxpayer conceded he had 
gambling winnings but argued he suffered gambling losses in excess of his 
winnings and therefore had no duty to report his gambling winnings.
164
  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the taxpayer 
for willfully attempting to evade and defeat income tax.
165
 The Fifth Circuit 
found that the taxpayer had a duty to report gambling winnings, despite the 
taxpayer’s claim that gambling losses exceeded gambling winnings, and 
that the taxpayer knowingly and willfully failed to report his winnings with 
the intent to defeat the payment of tax.
166
 It was sufficient that the Service 
established, and the taxpayer admitted, that he had gambling winnings.
167
 
Further, the Service was under no duty to explore leads to substantiate the 
                                                                                                                 
 156. I.R.C. § 7206. The willful delivery or disclosure to the Service of fraudulent lists, 
records, accounts, statements, or other documents is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of 
not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Id. § 7207. 
 157. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973). “Willfully” has the same 
meaning for I.R.C. §§ 7206 and 7207 with the distinction between the two provisions being 
the additional misconduct essential to the violation of a felony. Id. at 361.  
 158. United States v. Tager, 479 F.2d 120, 122 (10th Cir. 1973). 
 159. United States v. Romanow, 509 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1975). 
 160. United States v. Jernigan, 411 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 161. 292 F. 2d 630 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 162. Id. at 631. 
 163. Id. at 635. 
 164. Id. at 631. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 631-32. 
 167. Id. at 631. 
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taxpayer’s claim that his gambling losses excessed his gambling 
winnings.
168
 The taxpayer must include gambling winnings in income and 
has the burden to substantiate any gambling losses.
169
 
III. Deduction of Wagering Losses 
Generally, I.R.C. § 165 allows taxpayers a deduction for losses not 
compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
170
 With regard to gambling 
losses, I.R.C. § 165(d) provides that losses arising from “wagering 
transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of gains from such 
transactions.”
171
 Several additional limitations apply to the deduction of 
wagering losses: (1) the losses claimed can only offset winnings from 
wagering activities during the same tax year;
172
 (2) gambling losses cannot 
reduce income from non-gambling sources;
173
 and (3) excess gambling 
losses cannot be used as a carryover or a carryback to reduce gambling 
income in other tax years.
174
 Married taxpayers who file joint returns may 
pool their gambling gains and losses in applying I.R.C. § 165(d).
175
 
The predecessor to I.R.C. § 165(d) first appeared in the Revenue Act of 
1934.
176
 Prior to the legislation, the ability to deduct losses from legal 
gambling activities was not limited to winnings,
177
 but if the gambling 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. I.R.C. § 165(a). The amount of a deductible loss cannot exceed the adjusted basis of 
the property to which the loss is attributable. Id. § 165(b). As to individuals, loss deductions 
are limited to: (1) losses incurred in a trade or business; (2) losses incurred in a transaction 
entered into for profit; and (3) losses arising from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, 
or from theft. Id. § 165(c).  For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 
2026, the personal casualty and theft loss deduction is suspended, except for personal 
casualty losses incurred in a Federally-declared disaster; however, where a taxpayer has 
personal casualty gains, the loss suspension does not apply to the extent that such loss does 
not exceed such gain.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11044, 131 Stat. 2054, 
2087 (2017) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 165(h)(5)). 
 171. I.R.C. § 165(d).  For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 
2026, the limitation on wagering losses is modified to provide that all deductions for 
expenses incurred in carrying out wagering transactions, and not just gambling losses, are 
limited to the extent of gambling gains.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 
11050, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 165(d)). 
 172. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-10 (1960). 
 173. Boyd v. United States, 762 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 174. Skeeles v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 242, 244 (1951).  
 175. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-10 (1960). 
 176. Skeeles, 95 F. Supp. at 245. 
 177. Lakhani v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 151, 162 (2014). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
576 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:553 
 
 
activity was illegal, the ability to deduct gambling losses was so limited.
178
 
The congressional intent of the new legislation was to eliminate the 
difference in treatment between legal and illegal gambling losses.
179
 
Further, many taxpayers were taking deductions for gambling losses but 
failing to report gambling gains.
180
 The gambling loss limitation forced 
taxpayers to report gambling winnings in order to deduct their gambling 
losses.
181
 Although the question was left open, the courts ultimately 
interpreted the new gambling loss limitation provision as applicable to all 
gamblers, not just recreational gamblers.
182
 Thus, wagering losses are 
deductible only to the extent of wagering gains—regardless of whether the 
gambler is a professional or a recreational gambler or whether the gambling 
activity is legal or illegal.
183
  
A. Wagering Transactions Defined 
As I.R.C. § 165(d) allows a gambler to deduct wagering losses only to 
the extent of wagering gains, the determination of what constitutes a 
wagering transaction is a threshold question.
184
 The term “wagering 
transactions” is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury 
regulations.
185
 For a transaction to be a wager, the Service maintains that 
the following three elements must be present: (1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) 
consideration.
186
 Within the meaning of I.R.C. § 165(d), gains and losses 
from wagering transactions are the direct result of a wager entered into by 
the taxpayer and do not included gains and losses merely arising in 
connection with the conduct of wagering activities.
187
 Thus, the term 
“wagering loss” is used in the transactional sense, as the amount of wager 
(basis) minus the amount returned.
188
 For instance, the Service and the 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. 
 179. Skeeles, 95 F. Supp. at 246. 
 180. Lakhani, 142 T.C. at 162. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Stephen A. Zorn, The Federal Tax Treatment of Gambling: Fairness or Obsolete 
Moralism?, 49 TAX LAW 1, 22 (1995). 
 183. Skeeles, 95 F. Supp. at 247. 
 184. Although the term “wagering” has a different meaning depending on the context in 
which the term is used, generally, the term is synonymous with “gambling.” Tschetschot v. 
Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 914, 916 (2007). 
 185. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200417004 (Apr. 23, 2004). 
 186. Id. A wager is “money or other consideration risked on an uncertain event; a bet or 
gamble.” Id. 
 187. Mayo v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 81, 93 (2001). 
 188. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. AM2008-013 (Dec. 10, 2008).  
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courts have considered whether the following activities constitute wagering 
transactions. 
1. Sweepstakes, Raffles, and Lotteries 
A sweepstake, raffle, or lottery is a wagering transaction if the contestant 
is required to furnish consideration (a wager) in exchange for a chance to 
win.
189
 The chance to win prizes as part of a merchandising plan is not a 
wagering transaction if the customer is not required to pay more for the 
merchandise in order to obtain a chance.
190
 A no-purchase-necessary 
marketing sweepstake, which requires a contestant to submit a stamped, 
self-addressed envelope, does not have the requisite “consideration” 
element to be a wagering transaction.
191
 Thus, the Service held that the 
taxpayer’s winnings from a no-purchase-necessary sweepstake were not 
wagering gains for the purpose of offsetting the taxpayer’s wagering losses 




A casino transferred complimentary goods and services to certain players 
to induce the players to patronize the casino.
193
 The type and amount of 
these “comps” would be determined by senior management through either 
the management’s discretion or a formula that allowed each player to 
receive comps of approximately fifty percent of the players anticipated 
loss.
194
 The taxpayer, who gambled extensively at the casino, received 
automobiles and accessories, including five Rolls Royces, three Ferraris, 
one Bentley Corniche, five European vacations, diamond jewelry, Rolex 
watches, and tickets to numerous theater and sporting events.
195
 The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the comps constituted gains from 
wagering transactions, allowing the taxpayer to deduct his gambling losses 
to the extent of the value of the comps.
196
 The Fifth Circuit found that 
taxpayer’s receipt of the comps bore a close nexus to his gambling 
                                                                                                                 
 189. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200417004. 
 190. Id. The purchase of a single lottery or raffle ticket for relatively little consideration 
constitutes a wager. Rev. Rul. 83-130, 1983-2 C.B. 148. 
 191. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200417004. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Libutti v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2343, 2344 (1996). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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 “The relationship between [the] petitioner’s comps and his 




Craps dealers in casinos often receive tokes from players at their tables 
that take the form of bets placed by the player for the dealer’s benefit.
199
 
Unlike other service providers, casino policy prohibits dealers from 
performing favors of any kind for players, regardless of gratuities given or 
expected.
200
 The Tax Court held that the tokes were received in exchange 
for services performed for the players and were the direct result of 
employment as a dealer.
201
 The dealers receiving tokes could not have 
elected cash in lieu of the wager, participated in making the wager, or lost 
as a result of the wager.
202
 The taxpayer, the dealer who received the tokes, 
did not enter into a wagering transaction and therefore could not offset the 
amount of the tokes against his wagering losses.
203
 
4. Game-Show Expenses 
Expenses incurred by the taxpayer in attending and participating in the 
television game show, “Wheel of Fortune,” were not wagering losses 
deductible against wagering gains, but rather were nondeductible personal 
expenses.
204
 After being selected to appear on the program, the taxpayer 
and his family flew from Illinois to California for the taping of the game 
show.
205
 The taxpayer won three consecutive games and was awarded 
$14,850 cash and an automobile.
206
 The taxpayer included his cash 
winnings and the value of the automobile into income and deducted the 
expenses incurred by his family and himself for transportation, meals, and 
lodging.
207
 Admittedly the taxpayer was not a professional gambler; as 
such, the expenses incurred were not deductible business expenses under 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id. at 2346. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Allen v. United States, 976 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1992). Typically, dealers pool and 
split the tokes received during each shift. Id. at 975-76. 
 200. Id. at 976. 
 201. Id. at 975.  
 202. Id. at 976. 
 203. Id. at 976–77. 
 204. Whitten v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064, 1067 (1995).  
 205. Id. at 1065. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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 The Tax Court held the expenses involved were paid for 
specific goods and services and not losses from a wager or bet and, as a 





A gaming club employed shills, who were provided with chips to play in 
card games when an insufficient number of gamblers were playing.
210
 If a 
shill lost, the club absorbed the loss; however, if a shill won, the shill would 
split the winnings evenly with the club.
211
 The retention of fifty percent of 
their winnings was the shills’ sole compensation.
212
 The shills as a group 
lost more than fifty percent of their winnings, and the club deducted the 
losses as a business expense under I.R.C. § 162(a).
213
 Because the shills 
were betting with the club’s money and the club shared in each win and 
loss, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the club was engaged in 
wagering transactions.
214
 The Ninth Circuit characterized the relationship 
between the shills and the club as the shills acting on behalf of the club in 
placing bets.
215
 Consequently, the club’s wagering loss deduction was 





The taxpayer, a ticket seller at an off-track betting parlor, “punched up” 
tickets for himself on his computer terminal without paying for them.
217
 
The tickets placed bets on nine horse races with a total value of $80,280, 
resulting in winnings of $42,175 and a net loss of $38,105.
218
 Later that 
year, the taxpayer pled guilty to grand larceny in the third degree.
219
 The 
Tax Court determined that the taxpayer had reportable income equal to the 
value of the tickets minus the winnings he transferred back to his 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. at 1066. 
 209. Id. at 1068. 
 210. Nitzberg v. Comm’r, 580 F.2d 357, 358 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Collins v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CHH) 557, 558 (1992). 
 218. Id. at 558–59. 
 219. Id. at 559. 
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 The Tax Court held that the taxpayer could not offset his theft 
income with the $38,105 net loss because the loss was not the result of a 
wagering transaction or a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for 
profit.
221
 The taxpayer-realized income was from the theft of “the 
opportunity to gamble.”
222
 Thus, the income realized by the taxpayer was 
ordinary theft income, and his losses were not deductible.
223
 
B. Necessary Documentation 
Under I.R.C. § 165(d), losses incurred in wagering transactions are 
deductible only to the extent of gains from wagering transactions.
224
 
Wagering gains and losses must be evidenced by adequate documentation 
to take full advantage of the wagering loss limitation.
225
 The question is a 
factual one and is decided on the basis of all the evidence.
226
 The taxpayer 
has the burden of proving that wagering gains and losses were in fact 
sustained.
227
 Generally, neither self-serving assertions nor subsequently 




In Revenue Procedure 77-29, the Service provides guidelines for keeping 
adequate records of wagering winnings and losses.
229
 Taxpayers should 
maintain an accurate diary or similar record supplemented by verifiable 
documentation to substantiate wagering winnings and losses.
230
 Generally, 
the diary should include the date and type of wager or wagering activity, the 
name, address, and location of the gambling establishment, the names of 
other persons, if any, present with the taxpayer at the gambling 
                                                                                                                 
 220. Id. at 564. 
 221. Id. at 568. 
 222. Id. at 562. 
 223. Id. at 567–68. 
 224. I.R.C. § 165(d).  
 225. See Plisco v. United States, 306 F. 2d 784, 787 (1962). 
 226. Schooler v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 867, 869 (1977). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Stein v. Comm’r, 322 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir. 1963); Showell v. Comm’r, 16 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 103, 105 (1957). 
 229. Rev. Proc. 77-29, 1977-2 C.B. 538; see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, PUB. 529, MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS 18 (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-pdf/p529.pdf [hereinafter IRS PUB. 529, MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS] (requiring 
recreational gamblers to keep an accurate diary or similar record of winnings and losses, 
including the date and type of the specific wager or wagering activity, the name and location 
of the gambling establishment, the names of other persons present at the gambling 
establishment, and amounts won or lost). 
 230. Rev. Proc. 77-29, 1977-2 C.B. 538.  
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establishment, and the amounts won or lost.
231
 Verifiable documentation to 
establish gambling transactions includes wagering tickets, cancelled checks, 
credit records, bank withdrawals, and statements of winnings or payment 
slips provided by the gambling establishments.
232
 Further support of the 
taxpayer’s wagering activities or visits to gambling establishments includes 
hotel bills, airline tickets, gasoline receipts, credit card statements, 
cancelled checks, credit records, bank deposits, and bank withdrawals.
233
 
Affidavits or testimony from responsible gaming officials regarding 
wagering activities provide additional supporting evidence.
234
 
With regard to specific wagering transactions, winnings and losses may 
be further supported by the following items:
235
 
$ Keno: Copies of keno tickets purchased by the taxpayer and 
validated by the gambling establishment, copies of the taxpayer’s 
casino credit records, and copies of the taxpayer’s casino check 
cashing records. 
$ Slot Machines: A record of all winning by date and time that the 
machine was played, including the number of the slot machine 
played. 
$ Table Games (Twenty One, Craps, Poker, Baccarat, Roulette, 
Wheel of Fortune, etc.): The number of the table at which the game 
was played, the number of people at the table while playing, and 
casino credit card data, indicating whether the credit was issued in 
the pit or at the cashier’s cage. 
$ Bingo: A record of the number of games played, the cost of tickets 
purchased, and the amounts collected in winnings. 
$ Horse Racing, Harness Racing, Dog Racing, etc.: A record of the 
races, entries, amounts of wagers, and amounts collected on 
winning tickets and lost on losing tickets. 
$ Lotteries: A record of ticket purchases, dates, winnings, and losses.  
Notwithstanding insufficient substantiation, the courts have allowed 
wagering loss deductions based on estimates pursuant to the Cohan Rule, 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. Form W-2G (“Certain Gambling Winnings”) and Form 5754 (“Statement by 
Person Receiving Gambling Winnings”) also provide verifiable documentation. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
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which allows for an approximation of the taxpayer’s wagering losses if the 
court is convinced that a loss was sustained.
236
  
In Doffin v. Commissioner,
237
 the taxpayer was heavily engaged in 
“pulltab” gambling at several charitable gambling establishments located in 
Fargo, North Dakota.
238
 Pulltab gambling involves purchasing tickets 
contained in a large, old-fashioned cookie jar and immediately pulling tabs 
to determine whether the player won or lost.
239
 If the player wins, the player 
receives cash; if the player loses, the player commonly throws the losing 
ticket on the floor.
240
 The taxpayer admitted he had unreported winnings 
but contended his gambling losses exceeded his gambling winnings.
241
 In 
sustaining a portion of his claimed wagering losses, the Tax Court found 
sufficient evidence to apply the Cohan Rule.
242
 The taxpayer’s testimony 
was honest and credible; the taxpayer’s modest lifestyle and financial 
position did not indicate the increase in income as asserted by the Service; 
and, based on the time spent and amounts wagered, statistically, the 
taxpayer would have incurred losses.
243
  
In a Summary Opinion, the Tax Court recently denied “house players” 
gambling loss deductions because of a lack of substantiation.
244
 In Pham v. 
Commissioner,
245
 the taxpayers, professional gamblers, were employed by a 
casino to ensure enough players to start and maintain card games.
246
 The 
taxpayers received an hourly wage but were required to use their own funds 
for betting in the poker games.
247
 The taxpayers maintained that they did 
not include their winnings into income because their gambling losses 
                                                                                                                 
 236. In determining the amount of his travel and entertainment deduction, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals allowed George M. Cohan, an American entertainer, playwright, 
composer, lyricist, actor, singer, dancer, and producer, a deduction in close approximation of 
the amount expended. Cohan v. Comm’r, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930). Although no 
longer applicable to travel and entertainment expenses, the Cohan Rule is now applicable to 
virtually all areas of tax law. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 11.09. Taxpayers relying on 
the Cohan Rule must make a threshold showing that the expenditure was larger than the 
amount acknowledged by the Service. Id. 
 237. 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2157 (1991). 
 238. Id. at 2159. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 2161. 
 242. See Norgaard v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 874, 877 (1991). 
 243. Doffin, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2161. 
 244. Pham v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2016-73, at 2 (Nov. 8, 2016).  
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 3. 
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exceeded their gambling winnings.
248
 However, the taxpayers did not 
provide any documentation or other proof to evidence their losses.
249
 The 
taxpayers stated that they initially tried to keep track of their poker 
winnings and losses by documenting amounts won or lost daily, “but after a 
while they gave up that practice because it was ‘bad for their psyche . . . 
you need to be strong mentally when playing cards.’”
250
 The Tax Court 
stated that if a taxpayer establishes that a deductible expense has been paid 
or incurred, the amount allowable as a deduction can be estimated in some 
circumstances under the Cohan Rule.
251
 “In order for the Court to estimate 




C. Involvement of Other Tax Entities 
Taxpayers have enjoyed mixed success in avoiding the I.R.C. § 165(d) 
wagering loss limitation by employing other tax entities. In Brown v. 
Commissioner,
253
 the taxpayer formed a corporation, Gold Pot, Inc., and 
acquired all of the common stock issued by the corporation for $21,600.
254
 
Immediately, the taxpayer withdrew $20,000 from the corporation’s bank 
account and gave the $20,000 to an individual named Reppert, who used 
the funds to bet on horseraces.
255
 Reppert claimed to have devised a system 
for betting on horseraces, and the taxpayer was convinced that the system 
was sound.
256
 Pursuant to an agreement with the corporation, Reppert 
placed wagers on horseraces on behalf of the corporation, ultimately losing 
a total of $56,000.
257
 As a consequence of the wagering losses, the taxpayer 
claimed an ordinary loss deduction of $20,600 for the worthlessness of his 
stock.
258
 The Tax Court found that the “corporation was merely a sham set 
up to transmit funds to Reppert for wagering.”
259
 Accordingly, the Tax 
                                                                                                                 
 248. Id. at 6. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 4. 
 251. Id. at 10. 
 252. Id.  
 253. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 91 (1979). 
 254. Id. at 92. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 93. The taxpayer incurred a travelling expense of $600 in order to 
consummate the corporation’s agreement with Reppert, which the Tax Court found was a 
nondeductible personal expense of the taxpayer. Id. 
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In Chief Counsel Advice 200725036,
261
 the taxpayer had an ownership 
interest in a partnership, which provided entertainment in the form of 
gambling and related activities and, as part of its operation, engaged in 
wagering activities.
262
 In its first year of operation, the partnership sustained 
an overall operating loss, primarily due to significant startup expenditures, 
but realized a gain on its wagering transactions.
263
 That same year, the 
taxpayer lost substantial amounts in personal wagering transactions. The 
Service found that wagering gains and losses realized by the partnership are 
separately stated and pass through the partners as separate items.
264
 As a 
result, the partner’s proportionate share of the partnership’s wagering gains 
and losses may be combined with personal gains and losses in calculating 
the partner’s wagering loss deduction under I.R.C. § 165(d).
265
 The Service 




IV. Deduction of Gambling Expenses and Losses 
The tax treatment of professional gamblers varies greatly from the tax 
treatment of recreational gamblers. In order to determine whether a gambler 
is a professional gambler, the facts and circumstances of each case must be 
examined.
267
 Generally, the professional gambler must be involved in the 
activity with sufficient continuity and regularity, and the primary purpose 
for being involved in the activity must be for income or profit.
268
 In 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Id. The corporation adopted a plan to issue I.R.C. § 1244 stock, which would have 
produced an ordinary loss upon the worthlessness, but the Tax Court found that the 
corporation failed to meet the “operating company” requirement as it was merely a “paper 
company.” Id. I.R.C. § 1244 allows a shareholder to treat a limited amount of loss 
recognized from the sale or worthlessness of stock in certain small business corporations as 
ordinary loss instead of capital loss. I.R.C. § 1244(a)–(c). 
 261. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 200725036 (June 22, 2007). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id.; see also Jennings v. Comm’r, 110 F.2d 945, 946 (5th Cir. 1940); Joseph v. 
Comm’r, 43 B.T.A. 273, 275 (1941) (holding that the partners in a partnership engaged in 
the business of entering into wagering transactions may deduct their individual losses from 
wagering transactions against their distributive share of the partnership’s wagering gains).  
 266. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 200725036. 
 267. Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).  
 268. Dreicer v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 642, 643 (1982).  
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addition to the ability to deduct losses from wagering transactions to the 
extent of gains from wagering transactions, professional gamblers can 
deduct the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in their gambling 
enterprises.
269
 However, the definition of the term “losses from wagering 
transactions” includes any deduction incurred in carrying on a wagering 
transaction; thus, business-related expenses are also subject to the wagering 
gain limitation.
270
 Although recreational gamblers can deduct gambling 
losses to the extent of winnings,
271
 they cannot deduct expenses incurred in 
gambling activities as such expenses are nondeductible personal 
expenses.
272
 Finally, if professional gamblers sustain losses, such gambling 
losses are deductible from gross income in computing adjusted gross 
income.
273




A. Business of Gambling 
In addition to being entitled to deduct gambling losses,
275
 a professional 
gambler is entitled to deduct the “ordinary and necessary expenses” 
incurred in the business of gambling.
276
 Pursuant to I.R.C. § 162, the 
gambler can deduct expenses incurred to generate gambling income, such 
as traveling expenses and meals and lodging.
277
   
                                                                                                                 
 269. I.R.C. § 162(a). Professional gamblers report gambling losses to the extent of 
gambling income and other deductible expenses on Form 1040, Schedule C. IRS PUB. 334, 
TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 9; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, PUB. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p535.pdf [hereinafter IRS PUB. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES]. 
 270. I.R.C. § 165(d).  For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 
2026, the limitation on wagering losses is modified to provide that all deductions for 
expenses incurred in carrying out wagering transactions, and not just gambling losses, are 
limited to the extent of gambling winnings.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 
11050, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 165(d)). 
 271. I.R.C. § 165(d).   
 272. I.R.C. § 262(a). 
 273. Shollenberger v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 667, 669 (2009). 
 274. Id. A recreational gambler claims gambling losses, to the extent of gambling 
income, as an itemized deduction on Form 1040, Schedule A. IRS PUB. 529, 
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS, supra note 229, at 12.  
 275. I.R.C. § 165(d). 
 276. I.R.C. § 162(a). Trade or business classification subjects a gambler to self-
employment tax. I.R.C. § 1401; IRS PUB. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 
9; IRS PUB. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES, supra note 269. 
 277. I.R.C. § 162(a); see I.R.C. § 274 (restricting the deductibility and requiring 
substantiation of expenses incurred in business or for-profit activities with elements of 
personal pleasure). 
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In Commissioner v. Groetzinger,
278
 the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether the taxpayer was engaged in a “trade or business” within 
the meaning of I.R.C. §§ 162(a) and 62(a)(1).
279
 After terminating his 
employment, the taxpayer devoted sixty to eighty hours per week to 
parimutuel wagering, primarily dog races, with intent to earn a living from 
such activities.
280
 The taxpayer gambled solely for his own account and had 
no other profession or employment.
281
 For the tax year at issue, the taxpayer 
bet $72,032 and won $70,000, for a net gambling loss of $2032.
282
 Other 
than his gambling winnings, the taxpayer’s only sources of income were 
interest, dividends, and sales of investments, totaling $6498.
283
  
The Supreme Court observed that the determination of what constitutes a 
trade or business has “proven to be most difficult and troublesome.”
284
 
Although the term “trade or business” appears frequently, the Internal 
Revenue Code, the Treasury regulations, and judicial decisions have not 
provided a definitive and generally applicable definition of the term.
285
 
Reviewing prior decisions, the Supreme Court in Groetzinger 
acknowledged that holding oneself out to others as engaged in the selling of 
goods and services usually results in being considered as engaged in a trade 
or business; however, the Court found that such activities are not an 
absolute prerequisite.
286
 The inquiry is whether certain activities of the 
taxpayer can be characterized as a livelihood, occupation, or means of 
earning a living.
287
 The primary considerations are (1) the continuity and 
extensiveness of the activities, and (2) the good faith intent of the taxpayer 
to make a profit.
288
 The Supreme Court observed that a purely personal 
activity, no matter how continuous or extensive, does not constitute a trade 
                                                                                                                 
 278. 480 U.S. 23 (1987).  
 279. Id. at 24. Although the specific issue in the case was the application of I.R.C. § 
62(a)(1), the Service conceded that the meaning of the term “trade or business” is the same 
for both sections. Id. at 25. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) allows an individual to deduct trade or business 
expenses, other than the trade or business of the performing services as an employee, from 
gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income. 
 280. Id. at 24. 
 281. Id.  
 282. Id. at 25. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 33 (quoting Groetzinger v. Comm’r, 771 F.2d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
 285. Id. at 27. 
 286. Id. at 34. 
 287. Id. at 28. 
 288. Id. at 35. 
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 Applying a common sense concept of a trade or business to 
the facts of the case,
290
 the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer was 
engaged in the trade or business of gambling, stating “if one’s gambling 
activity is pursued full-time, in good faith, and with regularity, to the 




As to whether a gambler has a good-faith intent to make a profit, the 
factors relevant to the determination of a profit motive under I.R.C. § 183 
are often applied when distinguishing between a professional gambler and a 
recreational gambler.
292
 “It should be noted here, however, that [the rules of 
I.R.C. § 183] are considered guideposts for determining whether an activity 
is a business or profit seeking activity for purposes of §§ 162 and 212.”
293
 
The Treasury regulations, promulgated under I.R.C. § 183, are applied by 
courts to establish whether wagering activities are engaged in for profit.
294
 
The relevant factors are: (1) the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the 
activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s advisors; (3) the 
time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) the 
expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate; (5) the success 
of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the 
taxpayer’s history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the 
amount of occasional profits, if any; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; 
and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation.
295
 The Treasury 
regulations state that no single factor is conclusive, and the nine listed 
factors are not exclusive.
296
 The Treasury regulations and the courts often 
                                                                                                                 
 289. Id. at 29. 
 290. Id. at 35. 
 291. Id.  
 292. Chow v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1193, 1195 (2010); see infra text 
accompanying notes 364-367 (discussing whether the income limitation of I.R.C. § 183 
applies to recreational gamblers).  
 293. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 11.02[2]. I.R.C. § 183(c) defines the term “activity 
not engaged in for profit” as any activity other than one to which deductions are allowable 
under I.R.C. §§ 162 and 212. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2 (1972). I.R.C. § 162 allows a deduction 
for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business. I.R.C. § 
162(a). I.R.C. § 212 allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in 
the production of income. I.R.C. § 212(1). 
 294. Chow v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1193, 1196. Activities carried on primarily as a 
sport or hobby, or for recreation, do not have the requisite profit motive. Treas. Reg. § 
1.183-2(a) (1972). 
 295. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b).  
 296. Id.  
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look to the primary purpose of the taxpayer in the weighing process,
297
 with 
greater weight given to objective facts than the taxpayer’s statement of 
intent.
298
 Finally, a small chance of making a large profit may be sufficient 




In Boneparte v. Commissioner,
300
 the taxpayer was employed full-time 
by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and regularly gambled 
in casinos and at racetracks.
301
 Keeping his personal belongings in a locker 
in New Jersey, the taxpayer did not maintain a permanent residence, instead 
staying in the casino hotels where he gambled.
302
 The taxpayer gambled 
primarily in Atlantic City, New Jersey, but also gambled in other venues 
across the United States.
303
 He did not keep a contemporaneous written log 
of his gambling winnings and losses but testified that he kept a running 
ledger in his head.
304
 On his tax return, the taxpayer did not report any 
gambling winnings, reported $25,000 in gambling losses, and took $90,000 
of deductions for gambling-related expenses.
305
 The Service contended that 
the taxpayer engaged in gambling as a hobby, not as a business.
306
  
The Tax Court noted that a professional gambler must engage in 
gambling activities with the objective of making a profit.
307
 Although a 
reasonable expectation of a profit is not necessary, the relevant facts and 
circumstances must establish that the taxpayer had an actual and honest 
profit objective.
308
 The Tax Court then discussed the I.R.C. § 183 factors 
and determined that the taxpayer failed to satisfy any of the relevant factors: 
(1) the taxpayer did not carry on his gambling activities in a business-like 
manner, as he did not maintain complete and accurate records, only kept a 
                                                                                                                 
 297. J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 483 (10th 
ed. 2012). 
 298. Dreicer v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 642, 645 (1982), aff’d without opinion, Dreicer v. 
Comm’r, 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a).  
 299. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a). 
 300. T.C. Memo. 2015-128 (July 3, 2015); see also Boneparte v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2017-193 (Oct. 2, 2017) (holding that the taxpayer, based on the same facts but in later 
taxable years, was not a professional gambler).  
 301. Boneparte. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-128,  at 2. 
 302. Id. at 3. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 5. 
 306. Id. at 8. 
 307. Id. at 9. 
 308. Id. 
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running total of gains and losses in his head, and did not spend time honing 
or adjusting his system for gambling to improve his profitability; (2) 
although the taxpayer testified that he created a system for gambling on the 
game of baccarat, the court was not persuaded that he achieved any level of 
expertise and noted that his only preparation and consultation with experts 
was the time he spent discussing some aspects of gambling with a friend 
who frequently gambled; (3) the taxpayer provided no evidence of a history 
of success with business activities, other than working as an employee, and 
no evidence that his success as an employee of the Port Authority paved a 
way for success as a gambler; (4) the taxpayer provided no evidence 
regarding his history of income or losses from gambling; (5) the financial 
status of the taxpayer did not indicate a profit motive, since he derived the 




Considering all the facts and circumstances, the Tax Court held that the 
taxpayer did not conduct his gambling activity in a businesslike manner and 
did not engage in that activity with the necessary profit objective; therefore, 
the taxpayer could not deduct his gambling-related expenses under I.R.C. § 
162(a).
310
 Further, the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct his “purported” 
$25,000 of gambling losses as he did not report any gambling winnings and 
did not keep contemporaneous records of his gambling losses.
311
 Finally, as 
the taxpayer did not show reasonable cause for failing to keep adequate 
books and records, the taxpayer was liable for the accuracy related penalty 
pursuant to I.R.C. § 6662.
312
  
B. Tax Treatment of Professional Gamblers 
Despite the characterization of the activities of a gambler as a business, 
the wagering losses and business-related expenses of a professional 
gambler are deductible only to the extent of wagering gains.
313
 The 
asymmetrical treatment of taxing net gambling winnings while disallowing 
                                                                                                                 
 309. Id. at 10.  
 310. Id. at 11. 
 311. Id. at 19. 
 312. Id. at 23; see supra text accompanying notes 111-121 (discussing the application 
and consequences of the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty).  
 313. Mayo v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 81, 90 (2011), acq. 2012-3 I.R.B. 285.  For tax years 
beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 2026, the limitation on wagering losses is 
modified to provide that all deductions for expenses incurred in carrying out wagering 
transactions, and not just gambling losses, are limited to the extent of gambling winnings.  
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11050, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017) (to be 
codified at I.R.C. § 165(d)). 
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a deduction for net gambling losses is theoretically justified for gamblers 
who gamble for recreation.
314
 As with other expenses incurred for personal 
enjoyment, net gambling losses can be viewed as nondeductible personal 
expenses.
315
 Although harder to justify for professional gamblers, the 
disallowance of a deduction for excess gambling losses has been defended 
by the difficulty of distinguishing between the casual and the professional 
gambler.
316
 Nevertheless, the wagering loss limitation results in 
professional gamblers being treated differently than other types of 




In Lakhani v. Commissioner,
318
 the taxpayer was a certified public 
accountant who maintained an accounting practice and was also a 
professional gambler who experienced horseracing gambling losses in 
excess of gains.
319
 The taxpayer argued that “gamblers should be allowed 
the same protection as any other profession when the activity is legal and 
conducted as a profession.”
320
 Congress enacted the predecessor to I.R.C. § 
165(d) decades ago because, at the time, “gambling was taboo,” but now 
gambling is legal in most states and gamblers are recognized in society.
321
 
The taxpayer’s position was that treating the business of gambling 
differently than other businesses “constitutes a discriminatory, 
unconstitutional deprivation of professional gamblers’ right to equal 
protection of the laws.”
322
 The Tax Court noted that the lessening of the 
historic moral opposition to gambling does not undermine the rational basis 
for treating professional gambling losses differently from other business-
related losses.
323
 The original intent of Congress, to treat losses from legal 
                                                                                                                 
 314. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 4.06. 
 315. Id. Except as otherwise provide, I.R.C. § 262 disallows a deduction for personal, 
living, or family expenses. I.R.C. § 262(a). 
 316. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 4.06. 
 317. Zorn, supra note 182, at 20. See generally id. at 1 (arguing that the tax treatment of 
gambling includes restrictions that reflect a “moralistic anti-gambling bias”).  
 318. 142 T.C. 151 (2014). 
 319. Id. at 153. 
 320. Id. at 158. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. The taxpayer also argued that a pro rata share of the “takeout” extracted from the 
parimutuel betting pool by the race track to cover purse money, expenses, fees, etc. was a 
business expense and not a reduction of his gambling winnings. Id. The Tax Court held that 
the expenses paid by the race track from the takeout were expenses imposed on the race 
track, not the bettors; therefore, they were not deductible by the taxpayer as a business 
expense. Id. 
 323. Id. at 162.  
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and illegal gambling the same and to force gamblers to report wagering 
gains, still pertains to taxpayer reporting of gambling gains and losses.
324
  
In addition to wagering losses, professional gamblers often incur 
business-related expenses.
325
 If an expense can be considered either a 
gambling loss or a business expense, the more specific wagering loss 
limitation under I.R.C. § 165(d) controls over the more general business 
expense deduction allowance under I.R.C. § 162.
326
 Nevertheless, both 
business-related expenses and wagering losses are deductible from the 
gross income of the professional gambler in computing adjusted gross 
income.
327
 Generally, expenditures are eligible for a business deduction if 
the expense is (1) ordinary and necessary and (2) incurred in carrying out a 
business activity or purpose.
328
 Traveling expenses must be reasonable and 
necessary, including transportation expenses and meals and lodging, and 
incurred while away from home in pursuit of business.
329
 In order to deduct 
the cost of meals, the “sleep and rest rule” must be satisfied, requiring the 
gambler to be away from home for a period of sufficient duration to 
necessitate the securing of lodging.
330
 Except for payments of certain fines 
and penalties, which are not deductible under I.R.C. § 162(f), business 
expenses from legal as well as illegal gambling activities are deductible 
under I.R.C. § 162(a).
331
  
                                                                                                                 
 324. Id. The taxpayer was found liable for the I.R.C. § 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty 
for the years at issue. Id. at 163.  
 325. I.R.C. § 162.. 
 326. Pham v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2016-73 (Nov. 8, 2016).  For tax years 
beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 2026, the limitation on wagering losses is 
modified to provide that all deductions for expenses incurred in carrying out wagering 
transactions, and not just gambling losses, are limited to the extent of gambling winnings.  
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11050, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017) (to be 
codified at I.R.C. § 165(d)). 
 327. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1); Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 37 (1987) (White, J., 
dissenting).  
 328. I.R.C. § 162(a). “The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a 
way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle.” Welch v. Helvering, 
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).  
 329. Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946). Traveling expenses cannot be lavish 
or extravagant under the circumstances. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2). See generally BITTKER ET AL., 
supra note 68, ¶ 13.01[1] (discussing the requirement that the travelling expenses be 
incurred while away from home).  
 330. Strohmaier v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 106, 115 (1999).  
 331. 7 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28:157 (Westlaw, Oct. 2017 
update).  I.R.C. § 162(f) disallows a business deduction for any fine or penalty paid to a 
government for violation of any law.  I.R.C. § 162(f). 
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In Mayo v. Commissioner,
332
 the taxpayer was engaged in the business of 
horserace gambling.
333
 During the tax year at issue, he wagered $131,760 
on the outcome of horse races and won $120,463 as a result of those 
wagers.
334
 He also incurred $10,968 of business-related expenses, including 
travel, meals and entertainment, telephone and internet, admission and entry 
fees, subscriptions, and handicapping data.
335
 In Mayo, the Tax Court 
confirmed that the wagering loss limitation of I.R.C. § 165(d) applied to 
both professional and recreational gamblers.
336
 The more difficult issue was 
whether “losses from wagering transactions,” as used in I.R.C. § 165(d), 
included the cost of the losing wagers as well as more general business-
related expenses.
337
 Declining to follow an earlier Tax Court decision that 
included business expenses in the definition of “losses from wagering 
transactions,” the Tax Court held that, under I.R.C. § 162, the taxpayer was 
entitled to deduct the $10,968 in business expenses claimed in connection 
with carrying on his gambling business.
338
 
If a professional gambler sustains gambling-related expense deductions 
in excess of net gambling winnings, the net operating loss (NOL) 
provisions may apply to the excess; however, gambling losses in excess of 
gambling winnings do not generate an NOL.
339
 For the NOL provisions to 
apply, an individual must be engaged in a business, and the expenses 
incurred must relate to that business.
340
 The primary purpose of I.R.C. § 
172 is to treat businesses with fluctuating income in the same manner as 
businesses with a steady flow of income by allowing an NOL to be carried 
forward to subsequent tax years.
341
 Generally, an NOL is the excess of 
business deductions over the taxpayer’s gross income for the tax year.
342
 
However, until 2026, the limitation on wagering losses is modified to 
provide that all deductions for expenses incurred in carrying out wagering 
                                                                                                                 
 332. 136 T.C. 81 (2011). 
 333. Id. at 83. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 85-86. 
 337. Id. at 82. 
 338. Id. at 97. 
 339. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. AM2008-013 (Dec. 10, 2008). 
 340. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 19.02[1]. 
 341. Id.  Generally, an NOL is carried forward and deducted against taxable income for 
up to twenty subsequent tax years.  I.R.C. § 172(b).  Generally, the two-year carryback and 
the special carryback provisions have been repealed.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 
115-97, § 13302, 131 Stat. 2054, 2121–24 (2017) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 170). 
 342. I.R.C. § 172(c), (d);  BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 19.02[2].  
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transactions are limited to the amount of gambling gains; therefore, 
business deductions in excess of gambling gains are not allowable, thus, not 
contributing towards an NOL.
343
  
The Office of the Chief Counsel provides a formula for determining the 
business income or loss of a professional gambler as follows: wagering 
gains minus wagering losses, as limited by I.R.C. § 165(d), equals wagering 
income; wagering income minus business-related expenses equals business 
income or loss.
344




Situation 1: A is a professional gambler engaged in the trade or 
business of playing poker. Gambling is A’s sole occupation; A is 
not employed and has no other income. Throughout the year, A 
traveled to various casinos and other venues where gambling is 
legal to participate in poker tournaments. At the end of the year, 
                                                                                                                 
 343. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11050 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 165(d)). 
 344. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. AM2008-013.  For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 
2017, and before Jan. 1, 2026, the limitation on wagering losses is modified to provide that 
all deductions for expenses incurred in carrying out wagering transactions, and not just 
gambling losses, are limited to the extent of gambling winnings.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 
11050 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 165(d)). 
 345. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. AM2008-013. The third situation provided in I.R.S. Chief 
Couns. Adv. AM2008-013 is as follows: 
 Situation 3: C is a professional gambler engaged in the trade or business of 
playing poker. Gambling is C’s sole occupation; C is not employed and has no 
other income. Throughout the year, C traveled to various casinos and other 
venues where gambling is legal to participate in poker tournaments. At the end 
of the year, C had total wagering gains of $75,000, total wagering losses of 
$100,000, and incurred $15,000 in business expenses for transportation, meals 
and lodging.  
 C must report the $75,000 of wagering gains as gross receipts. Under § 
165(d), C may deduct wagering loss to the extent of wagering gains. Therefore, 
C may subtract only $75,000 of his $100,000 of wagering losses from gross 
receipts, completely offsetting his $75,000 of gross receipts. C may not carry 
over the excess $25,000 of (unused) wagering losses to offset wagering gains 
or other (non-wagering) income in another taxable year. Under § 162(a)(2), C 
may then deduct the $15,000 business expense without regard to § 165(d), 
resulting in a net operating loss of $15,000. C may carry that $15,000 net 
operating loss over or back to another year under § 172(b).  
Id. Nevertheless, for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 2026, the 
limitation on wagering losses is modified to provide that all deductions for expenses 
incurred in carrying out wagering transactions, and not just gambling losses, are limited to 
the extent of gambling winnings.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11050 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 
165(d)). 
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A had total wagering gains of $100,000, total wagering losses of 
$75,000, and incurred $15,000 in business expenses for 
transportation, meals and lodging.  
A must report the $100,000 of wagering gains as gross receipts. 
Under § 165(d), A may subtract $75,000 of wagering losses 
from the $100,000 of gross receipts, resulting in $25,000 of 
wagering income. Under § 162(a)(2), A may then deduct 
$15,000 in business expenses from the $25,000 of wagering 
income, resulting in $10,000 of business income. 
Situation 2: Assume the same facts as Situation 1, except that B 
also had $10,000 of (taxable) investment income. B must report 
the $100,000 of wagering gain as gross receipts. Under § 165(d), 
B may subtract $75,000 of wagering losses from the $100,000 of 
gross receipts, resulting in $25,000 of wagering income. Under § 
162(a)(2), B may then deduct $15,000 in business expenses from 
the $25,000 of wagering income, resulting in $10,000 of 
business income. B also must report the $10,000 of investment 
income as gross income under § 61. B therefore has $20,000 of 
total income ($10,000 business income + $10,000 investment 
income). 
C. Tax Treatment of Recreational Gamblers 
Like professional gamblers, recreational gamblers are required to include 
gambling winnings into income and are subject to the gambling loss 
limitation of I.R.C. § 165(d).
346
 However, unlike professional gamblers, 
recreational gamblers cannot deduct gambling-related expenses, as such 
expenses are nondeductible personal expenses.
347
 The deductible wagering 
losses of the casual gambler are itemized deductions,
348
 which reduce the 
adjusted gross income of the gambler in computing taxable income.
349
 As a 
consequence, if the gambler does not elect to itemize deductions but 
                                                                                                                 
 346. Professional gamblers report gambling losses to the extent of gambling income and 
other deductible expenses on Form 1040, Schedule A. IRS PUB. 529, MISCELLANEOUS 
DEDUCTIONS, supra note 229, at 12. 
 347. I.R.C. § 262(a); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9808002 (Oct. 24, 1997); Boneparte v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-128, at 15 (July 3, 2015). 
 348. I.R.C. § 63(d); Shollenberger v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 667, 668 (2009).  
 349. I.R.C. § 63(a). 
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deducts the standard deduction,
350
 the gambler effectively cannot deduct 
gambling losses and, thereby, offset gambling winnings.
351
  
With gambling losses being itemized deductions, gambling losses are 
potentially subject to provisions that limit the amount of itemized 
deductions otherwise allowable.
352
 I.R.C. § 67 allows the deduction of 
miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent the taxpayer’s total 
miscellaneous itemized deductions exceed 2% of adjusted gross income for 
the tax year.
353
 Fortunately for the recreational gambler, the definition of 
“miscellaneous itemized deduction” does not include the deduction of 
gambling losses.
354
 Since gambling losses are not a miscellaneous itemized 
deduction, gambling losses are also not adjustments to taxable income for 
the purpose of the alternative minimum tax.
355
 Pursuant to I.R.C. § 68, if 
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount, the 
taxpayer must reduce allowable itemized deductions by the lesser of (1) 3% 
of the excess over a threshold amount or (2) 80% of the otherwise 
allowable itemized deductions.
356
 Only deductions for medical expenses, 
investment interest, losses arising from casualty and theft, and wagering 
losses are not subject to this limitation.
357
  
                                                                                                                 
 350. Id. § 63(b), (e).  For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 
2026, the standard deduction is increased to $24,000 for married individuals filing a joint 
return, $18,000 for head-of household filers, and $12,000 for all other taxpayers, adjusted for 
inflation in tax years beginning after 2018.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11021(a) (to be 
codified at I.R.C. § 63).  
 351. Shollenberger, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 669; Rev. Rul. 83-130, 1983-2 C.B. 148. 
 352. I.R.C. §§ 67–68. 
 353. Id. § 67(a).  
 354. Id. § 67(b)(3).  For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 2026, 
the deduction for miscellaneous itemized deductions that are subject to the 2% floor is 
suspended.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11045 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 67(g)). 
 355. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i). The alternative minimum tax (AMT) was enacted to prevent 
taxpayers from avoiding tax liability on substantial incomes through the excessive use of 
preferential provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 
45.01. Generally, the AMT provisions, I.R.C. §§ 55-58, require a redetermination of taxable 
income that adds back into the tax base many items that normally reduce taxable income for 
regular tax purposes. Id. 
 356. I.R.C. § 68(a). For 2013, the threshold amounts were $300,000 for a joint return, 
$275,000 in the case of head of household, and $250,000 for a single taxpayer who is not a 
surviving spouse or head of household. Id. § 68(b)(1). After 2013, the threshold amounts 
were adjusted for inflation. Id. § 68(b)(2).  
 357. Id. § 68(c).  For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 2026, the 
further limitation on the otherwise allowable itemized deductions of higher-income 
taxpayers is suspended. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11046 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 68(f)). 
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Although not engaged in a business, a recreational gambler arguably can 
deduct gambling-related expenses under I.R.C. § 212(1), which allows a 
deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred for the 
production of income.
358
 In Shiosaki v. Commissioner,
359
 the taxpayer, an 
electrical engineer, was denied a deduction for amount expended for travel, 
meals, and lodging incurred in pursuit of his gambling activities. The 
taxpayer became fascinated with the game of craps and began reading 
books on the subject and attempting to devise a system to win at the craps 
tables.
360
 Unable to develop a winning formula, the taxpayer experienced a 
“long history of enormous, unceasing gambling losses.”
361
 In denying a 
deduction for his gambling-related expenses, the Tax Court concluded the 
taxpayer’s gambling activities were not motivated by a profit-seeking 
purpose as required by I.R.C. § 212(1).
362
 With regard to the possible 
application of I.R.C. § 212(1) to the facts in Shiosaki, the Service, in 
Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM) 9808002, noted “that wagering on 
one’s own account in games in which skill and judgement have no 
influence on the outcome and where the odds are against success is not an 
activity engaged in for the production of income, even if such wagering is 
continuous, dedicated, and systematic.”
363
  
In TAM 9808002, the taxpayers won a state lottery, with payments to be 
received annually. The taxpayers, who often engaged in various wagering 
activities, claimed as deductions expenses for legal fees, mileage, business 
meetings, meals and entertainment, and travel expenses incurred incident to 
their wagering activities.
364
 After holding that these expenses are not 
deductible under I.R.C. § 212(1) because the taxpayers did not produce 
meaningful evidence that they engaged in wagering activities with a bona 
fide expectation of profit, the Service held that the expenses could not be 
deducted to the extent of income under I.R.C. § 183.
365
 Generally, if it is 
determined that an activity is not engaged in for profit, I.R.C. § 183 allows 
a taxpayer to deduct expenses attributable to the activity to the extent of 
                                                                                                                 
 358. I.R.C. § 212(1).  For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and before Jan. 1, 
2026, the deduction for miscellaneous itemized deductions that are subject to the 2% floor is 
suspended.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11045 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 67(g)). 
 359. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 127, 128 (1975); see also Shiosaki v. Comm’r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 
110, 111 (1971), aff’d, 475 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 360. Shiosaki, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 127. 
 361. Id. at 128. 
 362. Id. 
 363. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9808002 (Oct. 24, 1997). 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
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income generated by the activity.
366
 The Service did not find any precedent 
to support the deduction and held the expenses claimed as typically 
considered personal, living, or family expenses, which are expressly 
nondeductible under I.R.C. § 262.
367
 
D. Deduction of Charitable Contributions 
I.R.C. § 170 allows taxpayers to deduct contributions to religious, 
educational, and similar nonprofit organizations.
368
 To qualify for a 
charitable contribution deduction, the transfer must be a “contribution or 
gift” and not payment for goods or services.
369
 A common form of 
charitable fundraising is the charity raffle, requiring supporters of the 
charity to make payments in exchange for tickets evidencing a chance to 
win prizes. The position of the Service is that the amounts paid to charities 
to participate in raffles, lotteries, or similar drawings for valuable prizes are 
not charitable gifts; therefore, they do not qualify as charitable 
contributions under I.R.C. § 170. “The purchase of raffle tickets is not a 




In Revenue Ruling 83-130,
371
 the taxpayer purchased for $100 a winning 
raffle ticket, entitling him to participate in a drawing to win a house.
372
 The 
charitable organization raised $200,000 from the sale of raffle tickets.
373
 
                                                                                                                 
 366. I.R.C. § 183(b). I.R.C. § 183 allows a deduction for expenses incurred in a not-for-
profit activity to the extent the income from the activity exceeds deductions allowable 
without regard to a profit motive. Id. The Treasury Regulations provide describe nine 
“relevant factors” that should be taken into account in determining whether an activity is 
engaged in for profit. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972). I.R.C. § 183 contains a rebuttable 
presumption that the activity is engaged in for profit if the activity was profitable for three of 
the five preceding years. I.R.C. § 183(d); see supra text accompanying note 294-299 (listing 
and applying the factors useful in determining the existence of a profit motive). 
 367. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9808002. Treasury Regulation 1.262-1(b)(5) provides that 
traveling expenses incurred while away from home are nondeductible personal expenses 
unless they qualify as expenses deductible under I.R.C. § 162 (relating to trade or business 
expenses); I.R.C. § 170 (relating to charitable contributions); I.R.C. § 212 (relating to 
expenses for the production of income); I.R.C. § 213(e) (relating to medical expenses); or 
I.R.C. § 217(a) (relating to moving expenses). Id.  
 368. I.R.C. § 170(a), (c). 
 369. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 68, ¶ 25.01[2]. 
 370. Patterson v. Comm’r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 847, 849 (1987); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 
C.B. 104. 
 371. Rev. Rul. 83-130, 1983-2 C.B. 148. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
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The Service held that the taxpayer was not allowed a charitable contribution 
deduction for the amount paid for the raffle ticket as the taxpayer received a 
chance to win a valuable prize; thus, the taxpayer received full 
consideration for the payment to the charitable organization.
374
 Further, the 
Service held that “[a] raffle is a disposal by chance of a single prize among 
purchasers of separate chances, and an individual buying a raffle ticket 
makes a wager through such purchase.”
375
 The value of the house won by 
the taxpayer could be included in the taxpayer’s income as a wagering 
gain.
376
 Since the taxpayer was not a professional gambler, the cost of the 
winning raffle ticket constituted a wagering loss and, as such, was 
deductible as an itemized deduction pursuant to I.R.C. § 165(d).
377
 
In Goldman v. Commissioner,
378
 the taxpayer purchased raffle tickets 
from various charitable organizations, testifying that he would have 
received a prize if his number had been drawn but, in making the purchase, 
he did not intend to gamble but to make a gift to the charitable 
organization.
379
 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the charitable 
contribution deduction, stating: 
Petitioner was not a contributor to a charitable organization 
when he bought his raffle ticket. He was merely purchasing that 
which the charitable organization had to sell, namely, chances 
for a valuable prize. . . . [Petitioner] received full consideration 
and he got just what he paid for. He was not making a charitable 




                                                                                                                 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. Annual lottery payments received in subsequent years are considered gains from 
wagering transactions in the tax year of receipt. Id.  
 377. Id.; see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 526, CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 6 (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf (considering the 
cost of raffles, bingo, lottery, etc. as contributions from which taxpayers receive a benefit 
and referring taxpayers to IRS Publication 529 for information on how to report gambling 
winnings and losses). 
 378. 388 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1961). 
 379. Id. at 479. 
 380. Id. at 480. The Sixth Circuit suggested that, if the value of the chances was 
“infinitesimal,” a charitable deduction might result, but the taxpayer did not sustain his 
burden of establishing the value of the chances purchased. Id. The Sixth Circuit also 
considered the treatment of the lottery ticket as a bargain sale not “theoretically unsound” 
but practically unfeasible. Id. 
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“Gambling is big business. From a barely tolerated vice . . . the gambling 
industry has become an integral part of the American economy, and a major 
source of financial support for revenue starved state and local 
governments.”
381
 Because of the growing acceptance of gambling and the 
proliferation of gambling opportunities, the tax treatment of both 
professional and recreational gamblers should be reevaluated. The business 
of gambling receives less favorable tax treatment than other types of 
business activities. With the clarity provided by the Supreme Court as to the 
definition of a professional gambler, the wagering loss limitation should be 
lifted, as losses and expenses incurred in other types of business are fully 
deductible. The recreational gambler should be able to deduct all gambling-
related expenses, including wagering losses, to the extent of wagering 
income because such treatment is afforded to other activities entered into 
without a profit motive. Nevertheless, whether professionals or recreational 
gamblers, taxpayers must understand the tax laws and procedures and 
follow the substantiation requirements applicable to their wagering 
transactions before incurring any gambling winnings and losses. If forsaken 
by Lady Luck, a gambler may be liable for additional tax and, if completely 
abandoned by her, may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 381. Zorn, supra note 182, at 1.  
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